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ICTs, knowledge work and employment:
The challenges to Europe
Luc SOETE*
That new information and communication technologies (ICTs) areimportant for growth and employment is now a matter of broad con-
sensus in policy-making, business and also, increasingly, academic eco-
nomics. The consensus appears to be based on three specific features of
these technologies that have been instrumental in bringing about fundamen-
tal, structural transformations in the economic, social and organizational
framework of society, opening up an increasing number of sectors to inter-
national exchange, competition and restructuring. Firstly, there has been the
dramatic reduction in the cost of digital information and communication
processing, a process of technological improvement that has not shown any
sign of decreasing returns and is unlikely to do so in the near future. This
continuous reduction in costs has been behind a sustained upgrading in the
performance of ICTs and the steady expansion of their applications. Sec-
ondly, there has been the technologically driven “digital convergence”
between communication and computer technology, between individual
person-to-person communication systems — such as the telephone — and
broadband, “one-to-many” information and telecommunications systems —
such as radio and television — which is rendering feasible any combination
of communication forms. Thirdly, there has been the rapid growth in inter-
national electronic networking, whether terrestrial or through satellites —
the world as a village. This effectively makes ICTs the first global techno-
logical transformation, hence the reference to ICTs as the “biggest ever
juggernaut” (Freeman and Soete, 1994), a process of technological and
economic transformation historically unprecedented.
These features of transformation affect all aspects of society. First, they
are by no means confined to the manufacturing and distribution of goods and
services, even though the economic transformation they are bringing about
* MERIT, University of Maastricht, The Netherlands. This article is based on a background
paper prepared for the ILO’s World Employment Report 2001: Life at work in the information
economy.
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might be most visible in those traditional sectors. Indeed, they primarily
affect communication between individuals, between organizations —
whether they are formally structured (as in the case of firms) or consist of
informal, virtually organized “communities” — and increasingly, of course,
between individuals and machines. Second, they effectively render physical
space and distance irrelevant and therefore question institutional or adminis-
trative boundaries, whether regional, national or even supranational, such as
those of large trade blocks and economic or even monetary unions (e.g. the
European Monetary Union (EMU)). It is in this sense that one may speak of
the emergence of a “new” economy which raises fundamental new policy
challenges (Petit and Soete, forthcoming).
In retrospect, the 1990s might well be characterized as a period of
major structural transformation which, though clearly connected with ICTs,
goes well beyond their mere appearance and diffusion. This applies to the
world as a whole, but especially to Europe. For example, the early 1990s
witnessed the sudden collapse of the centrally planned economies of eastern
Europe and their rapid opening up to market-led incentives, the most
extreme case being the economic and political integration of the former
German Democratic Republic into Germany and the European Union. A
year later, the 15 Member States formally set up the European Single
Market. In many, non-manufacturing utilities and service sectors, this pro-
cess of economic integration is still incomplete but it has nevertheless
brought about a gradual opening-up of many, traditionally closed, domestic
markets. Less precise in timing, but progressing at an accelerating rate, has
been the dramatic, worldwide deregulation of financial markets. Independ-
ent domestic monetary policy has become a thing of the past.
More recently, the European telecommunications sector has been
deregulated and liberalized as well. The resulting growth in telecom services
and their increasing variety have been such that, at least up to now — and
contrary to most forecasts and predictions — there have been no overall job
losses in the telecom sector, rather the opposite. And finally, there was of
course the macroeconomic convergence process leading to monetary union,
with the formal introduction of the Euro on 1 January 1999 in 11 Member
States of the European Union.
Structural transformation processes such as those concerning financial
markets or even the telecom liberalization process have mostly been global.
Yet they have involved certain regions or areas more than others. While
Europe appears to have been at the centre of most of the structural transfor-
mations mentioned above, it has, as yet, benefited the least from the growth
opportunities behind those processes. At least until recently, this has been
particularly true of some of the larger Member States of the European Union.
Many of the smaller European economies (e.g. Denmark, Finland, Ireland,
the Netherlands, Portugal) actually witnessed remarkable growth and
employment performances during the 1990s. Because their existing eco-
nomic structures were already open, these smaller countries appear to have
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been better equipped to respond, adapt and learn from the structural chal-
lenges brought about by both European integration and worldwide structural
transformations. Their policy-makers were apparently more aware of the
international implications and inherent limitations of their policy actions.
This awareness of increasingly limited freedom of policy action — with
respect to both the European Union and the global economy — was also suc-
cessfully conveyed to the public at large and to the local business commu-
nities. In many of the large European countries, by contrast, such reduced
freedom of action proved more difficult for policy-makers to accept, as it
often came into conflict with the previous, relatively strong emphasis on
national identity and the relative importance of the country’s international
policy role.
At the same time, the worldwide structural transformation processes
have also been raising fundamental questions with respect to Europe’s own
integration process. In some areas the carefully planned integration process
appears to have been overtaken — in purpose and speed of implementation
— by the broader process of worldwide integration. There could even be
cases of “costs to Europe”, with the European integration process effectively
implying a diversion (rather than creation) of new trade, information and
communication flows: European integration proceeding at the expense of
global integration. It has been argued elsewhere that this process of European
“cocooning” has been responsible for the loss in global competitiveness of
European firms in some of the most technology-intensive sectors, such as
ICTs (Soete, 1996). Of course, Europe’s trade and monetary integration co-
incided with the rapid, global emergence and diffusion of a class of “new”,
digital ICTs.
This article analyses the “new” institutional policy challenges that these
various structural transformations are raising for individual Member States of
the European Union and for the Union as a whole. It does not elaborate on
any empirical evidence, but the interested reader is referred to the claim —
made in our submission to the Portuguese presidency of the Union in 2000
(Soete, 2001) — that these transformations are behind the relative economic
success of the United States over the 1990s. According to recent evidence, the
so-called “Goldilocks scenario” of the 1990s in the United States — combin-
ing high GDP growth, low inflation and, more recently, high labour produc-
tivity with a general widening of the employment base (today also including
low-skilled workers) — appears increasingly related to the diffusion of new
ICTs (Oliner and Sichel, 2000; Scarpetta et al., 2000; OECD, 2000).
Before discussing these policy challenges, the article will briefly
review in a first section the technology-and-employment debate. While this
is an old and relatively well-known debate, it is nevertheless useful to put it
into historical perspective in order to highlight the analytical restrictiveness
of traditional “general equilibrium”, incremental approaches to technology
with respect to its likely impact on growth and employment. The argument
made here — and by many others — is that the present debate surrounding
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the emerging “new economy” — the “knowledge-driven”, “learning” or
“knowledge-based” economy or “information society” — signals the fact
that the widespread diffusion of new ICTs is indeed ushering society into an
entirely new or “post-industrial” era. The latter development, as will be
argued in the second section of this article, should be the starting point for
any understanding of the nature of the structural transformation ICT is
bringing about in our economies. The impact of ICT on the traditional
industrial and industrially dependent service sectors (transport, trade and
distribution of material goods) is fundamentally different from its impact on
“pure” service activities. The third and fourth sections argue that this
implies a continuous shift in value added, away from material production
and handling towards immaterial content. The implications for employment
growth and displacement are fundamental. As argued in the final section of
this article they lie behind the employment and labour market challenges of
the new economy.
Technology, growth and employment: What’s new?
The relationship between technology, growth and employment has been
the subject of many contributions in economics.1 Though controversial and
hotly debated over the past two centuries, the relationship now appears
straightforward, at least from the macroeconomic perspective. Either the
introduction of new technologies leads to more efficient production pro-
cesses, reducing costs by saving on labour, capital, materials, energy or any
other factor of production, or it leads more directly to the development of new
products that generate new demand. In either case, more welfare is created:
1 There is now a voluminous empirical and theoretical literature on this subject. In the twen-
tieth century alone, there have been four distinct economic debates on the relationship between tech-
nology and employment. The first, probably the most “classical”  in its origins, took place during the
economic depression of the 1930s. Contributors included Hansen (1931), Weintraub (1937) and
Neisser (1942). Many of the issues and concerns raised by these authors sound quite familiar today,
particularly in the context of the notion of increasing returns in current “new” growth models (e.g.
Aghion and Howitt, 1992). The second debate focused mainly on the post-war United States and the
fear of “automation” . In the 1960s, levels of unemployment were higher in the United States than in
Europe, and many blamed technological change. As a result, a National Commission on Automation
was appointed and produced a massive six-volume report (US National Commission, 1966). This
debate had little influence in Japan and in the European countries that were rapidly catching up. The
third debate, which began in the late 1970s, was particularly active in Europe. It focused on the
emergence of the cluster of computer-based communication, information and automation tech-
niques associated with microelectronics, which appeared at first glance to have great labour-
displacing implications (e.g. Freeman, Clark and Soete, 1982; OECD, 1982; Katsoulacos, 1984).
The fear that these displacement effects might dominate the compensating job-creation effects for
quite some time recalled the classical debate in many ways. As then, it appeared to be a reflection
of the times: there was a set of “revolutionary”  new technologies and persisting high unemployment.
The most recent upsurge focuses much more on the global aspects of the new ICTs and the possible
erosion of employment and high living standards in the advanced countries. Originating to some
extent in the United States, and linked to the political debate surrounding NAFTA, it quickly “glo-
balized”, and contributions have come from all over the world.
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in the first, through more efficient production combinations that liberate
scarce input resources; in the second, by satisfying new wants.
The extent to which this higher welfare or increased productivity feeds
back into employment growth depends on the extent to which firms translate
productivity gains into lower prices and new investment and the extent to
which consumers respond to lower prices in terms of greater demand. The job
losses that often follow the introduction of a new labour-saving process, for
example, are compensated by the job creation associated with the output
growth following the decline in prices, by additional employment creation in
other sectors — particularly the new technology-supplying sector — and by
the possible substitution of labour for capital following the downward wage
adjustment that clears the labour market.
However, the extent to which new or improved products generate new
employment growth depends on whether old products are replaced by new
ones and on the responsiveness of consumers to the new or improved goods
or services (as reflected in the income elasticity of demand). As long as there
are unsatisfied needs in the economy and as long as labour and product mar-
kets are sufficiently flexible, technological change, even in the form of new
labour-saving production processes, does not reduce aggregate employment
but generates more growth and jobs.
Most of the controversies that have dominated the economics litera-
ture on this issue over the last decades have centred on the automatic nature
of the various compensation effects described above. Many contributions
have questioned the way in which cost reductions following the introduc-
tion of new technologies effectively translate into lower prices and may lead
to more output growth: the functioning and flexibility of product markets
depend in part on the firm’s monopoly power, economies of scale and
various other factors influencing “price stickiness”. Similar issues can be
raised with respect to employment growth and the functioning of labour
markets; they range from downward wage flexibility to the many mis-
matches typical of relatively heterogeneous labour markets. In either case, it
is less technology that is at the centre of the debate than the responsiveness
and clearing function of the product and labour markets.2 The relevant
policy issues fall primarily into the category of improvements in the func-
tioning of labour and/or product markets.3
Other contributions in the classical economics tradition have questioned
the possibility of ex post substitutions between labour and other factors of
production. At least in the short term, the implications of a more rigid, fixed
2 As Von Mises put it: “Lack of wages would be a better term than lack of employment, for
what the unemployed person misses is not work but the remuneration of work. The point [is] not that
the ‘unemployed’  [cannot] find work, but that they [are] not willing to work at the wages they [can]
get in the labour market for the particular work they [are] able and willing to perform” (1936,
p. 485).
3 The OECD Jobs Study (OECD, 1994a, 1994b) can be said to have focused primarily on
these market issues, emphasizing the functioning of labour markets.
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set of production coefficients for analysing technical change and employment
are relatively straightforward. Labour-saving technological change embodied
in new investment could, if wages adjust slowly, lead to unemployment
because of insufficient investment to maintain the full-employment capital
stock;4 this is the so-called “capital-shortage” unemployment.5 There was a
lively debate during the 1980s on the extent to which the increase in unem-
ployment in European countries in the 1970s could have been due to this
phenomenon.
Yet other contributions question the automatic nature of the link
between input-saving new technologies and productivity gains. Most of these
studies — which often attempt to explain the “productivity paradox” — are
empirical in focus and attempt to find reasonable explanations for the disap-
pointing productivity growth of most OECD countries over the past two
decades, despite rapid growth in knowledge investment — particularly in
private-sector R&D — and the emergence of the new cluster of ICTs.6 How-
ever, the discussion is far from over. In particular, there have recently been a
large number of empirical and theoretical contributions from growth econo-
mists (e.g. Young, 1995; Mankiw, 1995; Soete and Ter Weel, 1999; Jones,
1999).
Finally, some recent contributions have focused explicitly on the inter-
national “open economy” framework within which most compensation
mechanisms are likely to operate. As a result, the relatively straightforward
linkages between technology, productivity growth and job creation men-
tioned above appear much more complex. A relatively simple elaboration in
terms of employment compensation due to foreign demand — e.g. through
export and import elasticities — complicates the matter greatly (Stoneman,
1984). More complete pictures including not only trade but also the effects of
international spill-overs of technology on productivity growth (OECD, 1999)
or international capital mobility (Turnovsky, 2000) make it much more diffi-
cult to identify the key links between the introduction of a new technology
and the ensuing domestic employment impact.
Many of the recent concerns about the implications of technological
change for employment appear to relate to these international compensation
4 This result is obtained by Venables (1985), for instance, with the use of a general equilib-
rium setting with fixed coefficients.
5 Capital-shortage unemployment reflects an apparent lack of “productive”  capital to employ
part of an adequately skilled and suitably located labour force. Capital-shortage unemployment can
occur as a result either of lack of physical capacity or of economic obsolescence; if variable costs
exceed price, capital will not be used (and the corresponding jobs will disappear) even though such
capacity could be operated in a physical sense.
6 This issue was addressed in some detail in Freeman and Soete (1985 and 1993); see also
OECD (1996).
ICTs, knowledge work and employment: The challenges to Europe 149
mechanisms and to the way that gains from technological change are distri-
buted internationally. In the gloomy vision of some popular authors,7 wages
in the most advanced economies are being eroded owing to the emergence of
a global market-place where low-paid workers compete for the few jobs cre-
ated by footloose global corporations (Rifkin, 1995). In other words, the glo-
balization of industry and, increasingly, of services casts a new light on the
interaction between technology and employment in an open economic frame-
work characterized by low transport and communication costs.
It is still generally agreed that, in a “world” economic framework, input-
saving technological change leads — through increases in productivity — to
higher welfare, wages and growth and thus generates new employment. But
the impact on individual countries is now much more complex because it
depends on a broad range of macroeconomic and microeconomic adjustment
mechanisms. In particular, positive and negative effects do not coincide
either in time or in space: adjustment takes time, and the industries and types
of workers that will benefit from technological change are different from
those adversely affected by it.
At the same time, the premium placed on the role of knowledge and on
the acquisition of skills in this global environment implies that international
differences in the pattern of employment and unemployment in industrialized
economies may be coming to depend increasingly on the capacity of national
economies to innovate, enter new, unregulated “service” areas and/or absorb
new technology more rapidly.
The information society: A move towards
a post-industrial society?
The analysis can usefully be set within a somewhat broader historical
framework, going back to the emergence of the concept of the “information
society”. Contrary to common belief, the notion of an “information society”
7 See, for example, Aronowitz and DiFazio (1994) and Rifkin (1995). As noted by some
trade economists (Krugman and Venables, 1994), such views are in many ways reminiscent of the
old Prebisch-Singer dependencia  arguments, but applied to the advanced countries. In the old core-
periphery models, “immiserising” growth would take place in the developing countries because all
the benefits of increased efficiency gains in the production of raw materials, agriculture and labour-
intensive manufacturing are passed on to the advanced economies, e.g. through lower prices or
higher repatriated profits. In the current view, the pattern is the opposite: most of the benefits of tech-
nological change are passed on to some of the rapidly industrializing countries through more rapid
international diffusion of technology from the advanced countries, the reinvestment of profits and
relocation of production to those industrializing countries and the erosion of various monopoly rents
in the advanced countries, including wages. In principle though, and in contrast to the Prebisch-
Singer model, such a redistribution process should lead, as trade theory would predict, to the con-
vergence of growth and income.
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is not new. Its origins date back to the earlier concept of a “post-industrial
society” and subsequent recognition of the importance of “information tech-
nology” in speeding up the process of industrial transformation (see Porat,
1977). The rediscovery of the concept of “information society” today is in the
first instance inspired by the sustained speed of technological improvement
(historically unprecedented) and the extraordinary pervasiveness of ICTs (see
Freeman and Soete, 1985 and 1993).
The dramatically increased capacity to store, process and disseminate
information at minimal cost has been described most extensively in the con-
text of industrial (or agricultural) production processes. Pre-dating even the
early “information technology” literature, the so-called “automation debate”,
popular in the United States in the mid-1960s, described how labour-saving
“robotics” would raise industrial productivity and bring about major organi-
zational changes. In line with this literature, many analysts have always won-
dered how, confronted with such pervasive cost-reducing technologies,
economies would be able to generate sufficient new employment (the various
price and substitution elasticities being too low to bring about sufficient
employment compensation8). More recently, the specific impact of new
information technology on services has re-entered this debate. It could indeed
be argued that the impact on services may be the opposite of what it is on
manufacturing.
In many ways, services can be defined as those activities (sectors)
where output is essentially consumed when produced.9 While this might well
be considered a rather narrow definition and one which covers only a limited
number of the sectors now falling within the statistical definition of service
sectors, it is an analytically useful definition because it highlights the intrinsic
immaterial, intangible nature of many service activities, be they personal
services (e.g. hair-cutting), entertainment (e.g. an opera performance), educa-
tion (e.g. teaching), health (e.g. a doctor’s visit) or public services, such as
applying for welfare services. It is this similarity centring on production and
consumption which has generally limited productivity improvements in such
activities. Incidentally, this also provides an intellectual argument as to why
the economics profession has generally tended to ignore the study and analy-
sis of service activities.
Almost by definition, ICTs allow for the increased tradability of service
activities, particularly those which have been most constrained by the geo-
graphical or temporal proximity of production and consumption. By bringing
8 Interestingly, this is also the main argument of those studies which limit their focus to
manufacturing (Pianta, 1995; Reati, 1995).
9 For early analyses along these lines, see Quinn (1986) and Soete (1987).
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in a space or time/storage dimension, information technology will make pos-
sible the separation of production from consumption in a large number of
such activities, thereby increasing opportunities for trade in them.10
In the case of today’s “new” ICTs — and their potential not just to col-
lect, store, process and diffuse enormous quantities of information at minimal
cost, but also to network, interact and communicate across the world as a
“global village” — both the time/storage and space dimensions are likely to
bring about further opening-up of many service activities, increasing their
domestic and international tradability. As in the case of the telephone, it is
likely that the “new” emerging computing and electronics manufacturing sec-
tor will in the end remain relatively small as compared with the growth and
size of new information and communication service sectors. However, even
the definition of the latter will become blurred as more and more of the tradi-
tional “physically present” service activities become “info-type” service
activities.
With regard to more traditional production processes — typical of
industrial production, but also common in traditional service sectors such as
transport, wholesale and retail trade — the impact of ICTs could well be
characterized as being exactly of the opposite kind. Rather than bringing
time/storage between production and consumption as in services, ICTs will
in the first instance aim at reducing the time/storage dimension between
production and consumption. Many of the most distinctive characteristics of
the new ICTs relate directly to their potential for linking up networks of
component and material suppliers, thus allowing for reductions in storage
and production-time costs — as typified in the so-called just-in-time pro-
duction system. At the same time, the increased flexibility associated with
the new technology allows for a closer integration of production with
demand, thus reducing the firm’s own storage and inventory costs — which
could be typified as just-in-time selling. Both features clearly work in the
opposite direction from that described above, i.e. they aim at reducing the
time/storage dimension between production and consumption. In doing so,
they might well reduce the “tradability” of a number of those intermediary
storage and inventory activities.
In essence therefore, ICTs are making services more tradable and more
like manufacturing, leading to a further convergence of industrial and service
activities. With the growing convergence between manufacturing and
services, service activities — which average some two-thirds of economic
10 This was certainly the case with regard to the invention of printing in the Middle Ages and
the impact this first new information technology had on the limited tradable “service” activity of
monks copying manuscripts by hand. It was the time/storage  dimension of the new printing techno-
logy that opened up access to information in the most dramatic and pervasive way and led, to use
Marx’s words, to the “renaissance of science”, the growth of universities, education, libraries, the
spreading of culture, etc. This opening-up, “tradability”  effect proved to be of far greater importance
to the future growth and development of Western society than the emergence of a new, in this case
purely manufacture-based, printing industry.
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activity in the European Union — appear to be increasingly important in their
own right and, in a growing number of areas, to be dominating manufacturing
rather than the other way round. Particularly since the advent of ICTs and
their “tradability” impact on many service activities, the latter have emerged
as “core” value-adding activities. It is essential in this context to distinguish
between data and information and knowledge.
ICTs play an essential role in the “codification” of knowledge. This
involves the transformation of knowledge into “information” which can either
be embodied in new material goods (e.g. machines or new consumer goods)
or be easily transmitted through information infrastructures. It is a process of
reduction and conversion which renders the embodiment or transmission,
verification, storage and reproduction of knowledge especially easy (see, in
particular, David and Foray, 1995). In contrast with codified knowledge, tacit
knowledge refers to knowledge which cannot be easily transferred because it
has not been stated in an explicit form. One important kind of tacit knowledge
is skills. The skilled person follows rules which are not known as such by the
person following them. They are linked to activities mastered through learn-
ing, but often of a non-routine kind.11 The most important impact of new ICTs
is that they move the border between tacit and codified knowledge. They
make it technically possible and economically attractive to codify kinds of
knowledge which have so far remained tacit.
The embodiment of codified knowledge in material goods has been typi-
cal of the dramatically increased performance of many new capital and con-
sumer goods, incorporating many new electronic information and
communication devices. The latter in turn have been at the core of the contin-
uous growth of productivity, investment and consumer demand in advanced
industrialized societies. As emphasized by authors criticizing the early “post-
industrial society” literature,12 this process could also be described as a process
of “industrialization” of services: the continuous replacement of particular
service activities by material household goods, embodying at least the “codi-
fied” knowledge component (e.g. washing machines, television, dryers, etc.).
The more recent electronic improvements in these products have further
enhanced their “household” performance, freeing further household time.
While the quality of these new material goods will not always substitute for
that of the service activity they replace (a dishwasher is a good example), the
codification process will be to some extent complete. The product might lack
user friendliness (a typical example being the video player), but the user is not
required to possess, or to understand, all the knowledge embodied in the
machine.
In services, by contrast and following the arguments set out above,
while the codification of knowledge will make some knowledge more widely
accessible to economic sectors and agents through information networks, its
11 One might think of such activities as gardening, biking or housekeeping.
12 See, for example, Gershuny (1978) and Gershuny and Miles (1982).
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immaterial nature implies that the codification itself will never be complete.
Indeed, the codification process will even rarely reduce the relative impor-
tance of tacit knowledge in the form of, say, skills or competencies, rather the
contrary. And it is precisely those activities drawing on tacit knowledge
which will embody the main value of the service activity: the “content”.
While part of the latter might be based on “pure tacitness”, such as talent or
creativity, the largest part will be greatly dependent on continuous accumula-
tion of new knowledge — learning — which, in turn, will typically be based
on the spiral movement whereby tacit knowledge is transformed into codified
knowledge, and new kinds of tacit knowledge are then developed from close
interaction with the new piece of codified knowledge. Such a spiral move-
ment is at the very core of individual as well as organizational learning.
This continuous shift in value from manufactured goods embodying
increasing amounts of “codifiable” knowledge towards service-based “tacit”
knowledge activities is typical of the new, emerging information society. It
explains the attempts of electronic and computer manufacturing firms to enter
information content activities. Within services, it explains the move of “car-
rier” operating firms — being those most directly confronted with the codifi-
cation of knowledge and its distribution — to enter content sectors (media,
education, culture).
In other words, the emerging information society will become critically
dependent on user demand for new information products and services. The
“demand articulation” of the latter depends crucially on the existing regu-
latory, institutional framework as well as on the overall macroeconomic
climate. Much has been written about the former. Many studies point to
(over)regulation of a number of typical “information society” service sectors
in Europe, such as multimedia, which prevents these markets from emerging
more rapidly. The emergence of new service markets involves, practically by
definition, new regulatory frameworks. In many typical cases of information
or communication services, commercial success critically depends on the
reaping of substantial economies of scale from network activities, with mar-
ginal costs being a fraction of fixed costs (one may think of movies, software,
financial and insurance services, etc.). Europe, with its fragmented national
markets and cultural diversity, is clearly at a disadvantage in reaping such
economies of scale.
The new employment challenges
The particular employment concerns associated with the emerging in-
formation society relate primarily to the likely impact of ICTs on productivity
growth and output growth, particularly in some of the new information-
service sectors described above. Much will depend on the new needs and mar-
kets those service sectors are capable of addressing; but much will also de-
pend on the way productivity gains get redistributed throughout the economy.
These gains are based as much on the overall counter-inflationary effects of
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falling costs and prices in microelectronics, computers and telecommunica-
tions which are affecting a widening range of products and services, as they
are on organizational improvements and other more dynamic, learning-based
efficiency improvements at the shop-floor level, in production planning or in
administrative activities.
In attempting to assess the employment creation and destruction effects
of ICTs, it is therefore no longer possible to distinguish many of the direct
negative and positive effects from the indirect effects. The direct effects
include both the creation of new jobs to produce and deliver new products and
services, and the replacement of old jobs by new ICT equipment. The indirect
effects comprise the many positive and negative consequences elsewhere.
Thus, while computer terminals are everywhere, it is not always clear
whether they are displacing workers or generating additional services and
employment. The computer industry itself produced machines which dis-
placed earlier types of electro-mechanical office equipment, while the micro-
electronic industry largely displaced the old valve (tube) industry. Today’s
digital telephone exchanges require far less labour to manufacture and to
maintain than did the old electro-mechanical exchanges, and the number of
people working in the telephone switchboard industry has fallen in most
industrialized countries. Competitive restructuring of the old monopolistic
networks has also resulted in a reduction of the number of employers, even
though the number of firms and the number of lines and cells has increased.
However, the new telecommunication infrastructure provides the basis for
numerous new information service industries and equipment, such as e-com-
merce, mobile communication, Internet access, content industries, data and
new multimedia services of all sorts. As a result, and contrary to expectations
and predictions, the telecommunications sectors all over the world did not
witness any employment decline over the last decade, rather the contrary.
To compare the sectoral balance of gains and losses is therefore a diffi-
cult undertaking as numerous empirical studies of the 1980s and 1990s have
shown. One certainty, however, is that an aggregate output growth which is
substantially above productivity growth — as has been the case over the past
few decades in a number of OECD countries, such as Denmark, Ireland, the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States — will lead to sig-
nificant declines in unemployment rates because the resulting employment
growth is then sufficient to absorb both new labour-market entrants and dis-
placed workers. As a matter of fact, the 1990s witnessed significant growth
in labour force participation in these countries. This has been a source of addi-
tional growth in itself because many of the new entrants (women and young
workers) display relatively high consumption levels, particularly in some of
the new ICT areas (mobile communication, Internet use, etc.).
Why then are employment concerns about ICTs back at the top of the
policy agenda, despite the many reassuring historical arguments, the macro-
economic success stories of the United States and some of the smaller Euro-
pean countries? A few of the reasons are outlined below.
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First, and implicit in the arguments set out above with respect to
services, there is the particular impact of new ICTs on employment in the
service sector, particularly in those services and occupations hitherto largely
“protected” from automation or “informatization”. In so far as such “shel-
tered” service employment has previously acted as the main absorber of
employment displacement from manufacturing and agriculture, there is an
obvious concern about whether new services will indeed be capable of provid-
ing sufficient new employment opportunities. As highlighted above, such new
services are crucially dependent on an appropriate regulatory framework.
Specifically, the emergence of new markets for information services requires
not just a more competitive framework, deregulation and open access; it also
requires new institutions setting out so to say the rules of such new markets,
including those governing property rights, security, privacy, etc. At the same
time, as the case of the Internet has shown, the speed of change can often out-
pace the old, “controlled” liberalization process pursued in many of the large,
continental European countries and Japan. In some areas, such as finance and
other intermediation services (public utilities), this might sometimes involve a
more dramatic “creative destruction” process, with a completely new commu-
nication pricing structure. Particularly in Europe and Japan, there is concern
that the regulatory reform is too slow and that the development of new
services is lagging behind their development in other parts of the world.
Second, in so far as the dramatic decrease in the cost of obtaining data
and information with new ICTs can be compared with a macroeconomic
deflationary effect, the question is whether existing statistical methods for
assessing “inflation” are still appropriate, and not increasingly measuring
inflation “illusion” rather than the “traditional notion” of money illusion. It
seems reasonable to assume that current European estimates of inflation — by
ignoring many new products and services and many of the qualitative
improvements typically associated with new ICTs — are overestimating
inflation by 1 to 2 per cent a year. As a result, and as one might expect on the
basis of the widespread diffusion of ICTs and the emerging information
society, many European economies have suffered from the unduly strict
monetary policies implemented within the framework of the EMU conver-
gence criteria and following German reunification. The contrast between the
relatively relaxed monetary policy of the United States Federal Reserve and
that of the European Central Bank — at least until 1999 when the 2 per cent
inflation target was formally launched — has been noted by many macro-
economists. This is not to deny the possible long-term positive impact of
budgetary and fiscal consolidation policies on interest rates, private invest-
ment and employment growth — so-called crowding in — as argued by the
European Commission. In the short term, however, the priority given to strict
macroeconomic monetary policy during most of the 1990s has not been con-
ducive to rapid emergence of the information society in Europe.
Third, since ICTs are “information” technologies — the essence of
which consists of increased memorization and storage, speed, manipulation
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and interpretation of data and information — they have already “codified”
large parts of human skills and will continue to do so. As emphasized in the
previous section, this is not to deny the importance of the “tacit” part of
knowledge. On the contrary, as more knowledge becomes codifiable, the
remaining non-codifiable part is likely to become even more crucial. Thus,
the ability to codify relevant knowledge in creative ways as well as the com-
petence to sort out relevant information and to use it efficiently will assume
ever-growing importance. By the same token though, an increasing number
of routine tasks, even if they require a substantial amount of technically
sophisticated skills, might become totally codifiable and see their importance
dramatically reduced.13 As the largest part of employment in industrialized
economies does involve such routine tasks, there is increasing concern about
the distributional employment impact of the information society. Further-
more, given the accompanying widespread use of information and computer
technologies, various skill, competence and qualification mismatches are
likely to be of a much more pervasive and general nature, raising questions
about the inherent “skill and competence bias” of new ICTs (Bresnahan,
1999). While these distributional concerns point to the crucial need for broad-
ening education and training to benefit all groups in society, they also raise
fundamental questions with respect to groups at risk of exclusion, such as
unskilled, routine-task labour or “inactive”, responsibility-averse employees.
Fourth, as a consequence of its potential for further international codifi-
cation and transferability, ICTs can be considered as the first truly “global”
technology. The capability of ICTs to codify information and knowledge over
both distance and time not only brings about more global access, it also
enables firms/organizations to relocate the sort of routine activities that can
be codified and thus internationally traded. In other words, ICTs contribute to
economic transparency and — in so far as it highlights the cost advantages of
alternative locations — to international capital mobility and international
“outsourcing” of particular activities. While the global benefits of this more
transparent, borderless world are undisputed, there is again concern about the
worldwide distribution of those benefits. For the poorest, most peripheral
countries/regions there is concern about being excluded; for some of the
industrialized, rich countries/regions, like Europe, there is concern about the
increasing erosion of the monopoly rents associated with innovation and its
implications for employment, wages and established social security systems.
In most countries of the European Union, the financing of the national social
security system and, more generally, that of the welfare state have been
closely linked to employment, through contributions from both employers
and employees. But in an increasingly global and economically transparent
13 By contrast, it is interesting to observe that relatively “simple” human tasks (such as gar-
dening) might never become codifiable. This explains why the idea of ICTs as “skill biased” tech-
nical change does not really capture the complexities of the de-skilling and reskilling processes
involved (for more detail, see OECD, 1996).
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world, the national foundations of these systems are being undermined, rais-
ing fundamental questions about international competitiveness and/or the
long-term sustainability of the national welfare system.
Fifth, and also with respect to Europe, while much has been written
about the likely growth and employment impacts of EMU — including
increased transparency in costs and prices, increased financial mobility, price
stability and the crowding-in effect of private capital following fiscal con-
solidation induced by the so-called Maastricht criteria — little attention has
been devoted to the likely impact of a set of radically new technologies such
as ICTs on employment growth in the prospective single-currency area. The
past decade suggests that European countries have not learnt much from each
other’s experience — an issue taken up in the next section.
New labour-market policy challenges
On the surface, the diversity of institutions and experiences actually
appears to have limited Europe’s endogenous capacity to gather sufficient
macroeconomic growth momentum to reduce the very high unemployment
rates of the 1980s. The strong inflation and mass unemployment that devel-
oped in the late 1970s and early 1980s were, from this perspective, symptoms
and ultimately characteristics of a period of economic crisis. The timid insti-
tutional changes of the 1980s were motivated by the need to get out of that
crisis. This led to structural adjustments — a key phrase in the 1980s —
aimed at reforming labour market institutions. Increasing the flexibility of
labour markets therefore became a common policy objective.
Another field of reform — already discussed above and more typical of
the late 1980s — was linked to a more general concern to expand the sphere
of “deregulated” market activities so as to take advantage of internationaliza-
tion and the potential of ICTs that modified the time and space dimensions of
economic activities. For all developed countries, the 1980s were an early
phase in the diffusion of a new technological system centring on the new
ICTs. Still, some countries were ahead and others lagged behind.14 The inter-
nationalization of most developed economies was under way, and interna-
tional competitiveness was thought to depend strongly on mastering those
new technologies.
Conscious of entering a period of transition, countries variously
launched these two waves of institutional reform. While the deregulation of
“regulated” services appears to have been a worldwide phenomenon that
started in the early 1980s in the United States and the United Kingdom and
spread progressively to the entire developed world over that decade, the need
to deregulate labour markets was of particular concern to Europe.
14 See, for example, the spread in the ratios of ICT investment expenditures to GDP over the
1980s as compared to the more recent period (OECD, 1999).
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The notion of “European sclerosis” developed in the early 1980s to
account for the continuous rise of unemployment in Europe. This characteri-
zation was a partial view, however, omitting to consider the quality of the
jobs created and the overall rates of employment which related to different
lifestyles and traditions across Europe. Still, the debate itself was the expres-
sion of widespread pressure to reform the rules and practices of labour mar-
kets towards more flexibility in response to short-run changes in product
markets, new patterns of organization (both within firms and across firms)
and creation of a more active labour market. Change in the sectoral structure
of employment did facilitate such transformations. The expansion of service
activities, much less institutionalized than manufacturing activities, did help
to achieve more flexible labour markets. This shift in the structure of employ-
ment was more open to new forms of work organization than were the large-
scale manufacturing activities, where labour was more organized and where
more rigid practices constrained the organization of work, although they were
under the strain of deregulation and the ensuing rearrangement of their pro-
duction processes. By the end of the 1980s, labour market flexibility was the
major issue on the policy agenda.15
Only in the late 1990s was the policy debate widened to a more general
discussion on work, “non-work” and the status of work. While many of the
concepts used are reminiscent of the 1960s, these debates are new and, in the
final analysis, do not replicate those of the aftermath of the Second World
War: most of the rich, OECD societies in which they are taking place now
include more double-income families, living mostly in urban areas, with
nearly three-quarters of them working in the service industry. The old debates
and the choices made in the post-war period — especially regarding types of
welfare systems — still influence today’s options, but societies are now more
affluent and more educated. Accordingly, the issues involved in redefining
the status and content of work over each person’s individual life cycle are
now more centred around the kinds of training, the types of family structures
preferred, the boundaries between public and private or personal and collec-
tive, and the division between work and non-work activities over one’s life
cycle (see KBS, 2000).
The role of education and training is certainly part of these delibera-
tions, but again allowance must be made for the new context, one in which
the supply of qualified labour has been substantially enlarged and the use of
knowledge in economic activities extended, be it in its codified or tacit forms.
Yet here too, the debate seems overly influenced by a vision centring on pro-
duction processes, without taking account of personal needs and well-being.
Thus, following the arguments set forth in the economics literature, the con-
sideration of education and training has focused on two shifts that are induc-
ing changes in their effective roles, namely the increase in the demand for
15 See, for example, the early focus of The OECD Jobs Study on national unemployment and
job creation issues (OECD, 1995).
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skilled labour and the abundant supply of qualified labour. Both develop-
ments obviously help to explain the increase in skill levels and, more gener-
ally, in the knowledge intensity of society. On the one hand, the debate about
the presumed “skill bias” of technological change emphasizes the fact that
firms have upgraded their skill requirements in order to face uncertainty
about the evolution of production processes in times of rapid technological
change and tense competition — once the direct effect of trade with low-wage
countries has been scaled down to its relatively minor dimension (for a short
survey of this issue, see Petit and Soete, 1999). On the other hand, studies
have stressed that the supply of qualified labour has increased all over the
developed world to such an extent that in some countries it has in itself
reduced the number of jobs for the so-called “non-qualified” (Goux and Mau-
rin, 1996; OECD, 1996, ch. 4).
By contrast, little has been said about two other major dimensions of the
new challenge to education and training. One has to do with the social value
of education and training both for participating in traditional social networks
(conditioning family structuring, job opportunities, etc.) and for accessing
new life patterns and taking advantage of complex new types of service pro-
vision (not only in health and education, but also in finance, transport, com-
munication and distribution). From this perspective education and training
also have to respond to new needs in economies in which relationships
between producers and users have become essential knowledge links, with
“smart” consumers as the final link in the chain. The other neglected dimen-
sion has to do with the laws of obsolescence of knowledge brought about by
education and training. Recent work on literacy shows that the rate of obsol-
escence, as measured by comparing the effective capabilities of various edu-
cation levels after several years, varies widely among countries (OECD,
1997).
These two issues raise questions about the content of education and
training, the forms and channels through which they are provided and their
timing along the life cycle. These questions are rather different from those
raised in the post-war era when educational systems provided initial training
of different kinds, giving access to specific professional trajectories more or
less rigidly predetermined across countries. The advantages brought by edu-
cation remain effective, but they are now more widespread and open to
various upgrading opportunities and downgrading hazards encountered on
the job. It follows that the meritocratic model, whereby positions were gained
according to years of education, may not work as systematically and steadily
as before. Rates of return to a given degree or course may vary widely, and it
is not that easy to determine which curriculum to follow, especially since
careers not only correspond to a wide range of wage trajectories but also
increasingly include non-wage remuneraton (such as stock options or stand-
ard financial benefits).
As a matter of fact, with the new economic environment of the 1990s
the question of wages and incentives has gained dramatically in importance.
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Individual countries have developed many practical ways of alleviating the
fiscal levy on the highest incomes, developing new schemes for profit-
sharing, wage funds, and reducing minimum wages and thereby reducing
their impact on demand for labour.
Concluding remarks
It is difficult to predict the precise employment impact of the new ICTs
and the emerging information society, whether in terms of volume or of sec-
toral or occupational composition. Both direct and indirect employment
effects are likely to be substantial and will undoubtedly further intensify the
structural transformation of society. Thus, just as industries which barely
existed before 1950 now employ millions of people — e.g. the software
industry, the electronic computer industry itself, the microelectronic industry,
the VCR and TV industries — today’s emerging information and communi-
cation service sectors are providing new employment opportunities. How-
ever, the extent to which they will do so more rapidly will depend crucially
on whether the regulatory institutional environment is conducive to the emer-
gence of new information and communication markets and on the appropri-
ateness of the macroeconomic climate. On both accounts the United States
led the way over the 1990s.
At the same time, there is — particularly in Europe — apprehension that
both the direct and indirect employment-displacement effects of the informa-
tion society will be substantial. Indeed, in some of the most typical infor-
mation- and communication-dependent service sectors — such as finance,
insurance and other business services — the efficiency-enhancing potential
of the new ICTs is high. The number of jobs displaced, particularly among
those of the routine kind, is expected to be high in those sectors. Furthermore,
there is concern that many traditional, “non-tradable” service activities might
become internationally tradable with the advent of the information society
and that those activities will be relocated to low-wage countries or regions.
Again, the jobs likely to be displaced are simple, routine-based jobs, not
necessarily of the unskilled, manual type, but rather those in which the infor-
mation or knowledge content appears most amenable to codification through
ICTs.
Whether the net balance of these direct and indirect employment effects
will ultimately be positive or negative cannot be assessed simply by counting
new jobs gained and old jobs destroyed. On this point, what needs to be
recognized is that the information society’s expansionary effects on any
national economy or on the world economy as a whole will paradoxically
depend on how the new ICTs create the basis for a virtuous circle of growth
in which investment is high and labour productivity grows fast, but output
grows even faster, so that there remains net growth in employment. This is
why one should remain fundamentally optimistic about the inherent, long-
term welfare and employment opportunities associated with the emerging
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information society. However, such welfare gains and new opportunities can-
not be taken for granted. Whether the virtuous circle can be sustained in
Europe will depend on macroeconomic policies, regulatory and institutional
reform in labour and product markets, more user-friendly and user-focused
technology policies, new distributional policies, policies aimed at boosting
productivity growth, as well as policies aimed at “integrating” the new ICTs
in society. If there is a good match between technologies, policies and insti-
tutions, prolonged periods of full employment are much more likely to result.
Within the framework of the EMU, these developments raise new
policy challenges directly related to various aspects of the economic use and
organizational integration of new technologies, all of which are likely to have
direct or indirect implications for employment creation at the level of the
European Union and at local level, and all of which are likely to become cru-
cially dependent on successful “skill matching” at those two levels. Two such
challenges are likely to dominate the European policy debate in the years to
come.
First and foremost, there is likely to be increased friction between
regions and countries over demand for and supply of various categories of
skilled labour. Particular regions are likely to experience increasing growth
bottlenecks due to the local unavailability of particular skills, competences or
knowledge. The lack of labour mobility across Europe is likely to be felt
much more directly in a single-currency Europe than it has been in a freely
trading single-market Europe.
Second, there is also a likelihood of greater productive capital mobility
across Europe. Such mobility will increasingly become dependent on “real”
factors such as the ratio of productivity to gross wage costs (unit labour costs)
or the local availability of other crucial factors of production (e.g. skilled
labour, qualified suppliers, infrastructure, etc.). In both cases the cost and
availability of skilled labour will become crucial variables of “locational”
advantage.
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